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Abstract 
 
In theory, there is no hierarchy of rights in the Equality Act 2010: equal weight is given to 
each protected characteristic. At least two, very different, critiques though have been made 
of this argument as it relates to religion or belief. One argument is that religious 
discrimination has unfairly been given a lower priority than other characteristics, particularly 
sexual orientation. The second is that religion is inherently different, partly because religions 
tend to set extensive, and possibly discriminatory, rules for behaviour. In order to keep 
religion or belief claims within a reasonable limit, religious discrimination claims must 
therefore be confined. However, the perceived danger of confining these claims is that, 
because of the insistence that there is no hierarchy of rights, this will lead to reduced 
protection across all the rights since concepts which apply across the Equality Act will be 
reinterpreted in order to avoid unwanted results. As will be demonstrated though, both of 
these arguments are misconceived.  
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Introduction 
 
The Equality Act 2010 was designed to unify and simplify discrimination law, gathering 
together the various pieces of legislation dealing with each ground of discrimination, and 
creating one overall scheme. Whilst there are some differences in the provisions relating to 
the various protected characteristics, the Act in theory does not have a hierarchy of rights. 
Leaving aside the more extensive provisions relating to disability due to its specific nature, 
each right is given the same degree of protection, although the provisions relating to each 
are not identical. However, this theoretical equivalency between each ground has, it has 
been argued, been challenged by the inclusion of religion or belief as a protected 
characteristic.  
 
Two very different critiques of this formal non-hierarchy have been made. The first is that a 
hierarchy does in fact exist since religious discrimination has unfairly been given a lower 
priority than other characteristics, particularly sexual orientation, as can be seen from cases 
where there is a clash of rights (see eg Carey and Carey, 2012). The second argument has a 
very different starting point: religion or belief is inherently different from other protected 
characteristics, perhaps because it is a choice rather than an inherent characteristic of an 
individual, and certainly because religions or beliefs place extensive obligations for 
behaviour on their adherents (see eg, McColgan 2009, 2014; Pitt, 2010). In particular, these 
obligations may require believers to discriminate against others. Thus its inclusion may 
inhibit rather than progress efforts to eradicate discrimination, particularly, although not 
exclusively, sexual orientation discrimination. As a result, religious claims must be confined. 
In order to do so, established concepts such as the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination, will be reinterpreted in order to avoid unwanted results. However, this will, 
so the argument goes, create problems because of the insistence that there is no hierarchy 
of rights. Decisions made in the context of religious claims will have an effect more broadly 
because such concepts apply across all the protected characteristics. Including religion and 
belief, it is argued, will therefore have a detrimental effect on anti-discrimination rights as a 
whole. This article will, however, challenge both of these critiques and argue that these fears 
are unfounded.  
 
Is religion treated less favourably than other rights? 
 
Many of the claims that religion is treated less favourably than other rights refer to the 
specific context of the conflict between religious and sexual orientation discrimination. 
(Ahdar and Leigh, 2013; Hambler, 2012; Rivers, 2007). There have been several cases where 
employees or service providers have argued they should be exempted from having to 
perform certain duties because of their religious beliefs. They have almost uniformly though 
been unsuccessful. Most of these cases predate the Equality Act, but the provisions they 
interpret, which were contained in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
2003, the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 and the Equality Act 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, are almost identical to those in the Act and the 
results would not be different under the newer legislation.  
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The first significant case to consider this clash of rights was Ladele v Islington LBC ([2010] 1 
WLR 955) where a registrar refused to perform civil partnerships because of her religious 
beliefs that marriage should only be between a man and a woman. She ultimately failed in 
her claim that her employer’s refusal to accommodate her1 amounted to direct and indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of religion. Although her claim of direct discrimination was 
successful at first instance, this conclusion was erroneous and was rejected by the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT). Direct discrimination requires less favourable treatment 
because of a protected characteristic.2 Any person who refused to perform civil partnerships 
would have been subject to disciplinary action, regardless of whether this was for a religious 
reason or not. Her claim of indirect discrimination, which was again successful at first 
instance but failed at the EAT and Court of Appeal, was rejected. While it was agreed that 
the council had applied a provision, criterion or practice which put people of Ladele’s 
religion or belief at a disadvantage compared to others, Islington could demonstrate that it 
was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim to require her to provide its 
services in a non-discriminatory way in line with its equality policies.3 Similarly, in McFarlane 
v Relate ([2010] EWCA Civ 880) a relationship counsellor refused to provide psycho-sexual 
counselling to same-sex couples and his employer refused to permit him to do this. He too 
was unsuccessful in his indirect religious claim because it was proportionate for Relate to 
require non-discrimination in line with its ethos and Code of Ethics. 
 
Religious defences made to claims of sexual orientation discrimination within the context of 
the provision of services have also failed. In Bull v Hall ([2013] 1 WLR 3741) and Black v 
Wilkinson ([2013] 1 WLR 2490) it was held that the owners of bed and breakfast 
accommodation had directly discriminated against gay couples by, in Bull refusing them 
double-bedded accommodation, and in Black refusing to allow the couple to share a room at 
all, because the owners would only allow married couples to do so.4 In both cases it was held 
that there was no defence to the claim of direct discrimination either within the Equality Act 
or on the basis of Art 9 ECHR. In a different context, litigation brought by a Catholic adoption 
charity, Catholic Care,5 claiming that it should be permitted to refuse to accept gay couples 
as potential adopters in its adoption service was also unsuccessful. While it argued that it 
would have to close as a result since it would no longer be able to provide the service in 
accordance with its Catholic beliefs, this was not considered to be sufficient justification to 
allow it to discriminate. 
 
Some religious claims made within the entirely religious sphere have also failed. In Reaney v 
Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance, (ET 1602844/2006) Reaney applied for the post of 
Diocesan Youth Officer, but was rejected because of his sexual orientation. The Diocese 
argued that the post fell within the ‘organised religion’ exception in the Equality Act 2010.6 
This allows an employer to discriminate if the employment is for the purposes of an 
organised religion and the discriminatory requirement is applied either to comply with the 
doctrines of the religion (the ‘compliance principle’), or to avoid conflict with the strongly 
held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers (the ‘non-
conflict’ principle). However, while the Tribunal agreed that the post was one of the small 
number of non-clergy positions which was for the purposes of an organised religion, it held 
that the Diocese’s actions did not fall within either the compliance or the non- conflict 
 4 
principle since Reaney had said that he would remain celibate and therefore complied with 
the religion’s teachings. The discrimination was thus illegal and Reaney won his claim.  
 
While such religious claims have been unsuccessful, only in a very limited sense however, do 
these cases show that religion is placed under sexual orientation in any strict hierarchical 
sense. There are numerous explanations for these cases which do not rest on the automatic 
trumping of one right above another. Since these are complex matters on which it is possible 
to have a range of opinions, I will not discuss the particular merits or the appropriate 
balance of rights in each of these decisions but rather consider what, taken as a whole, they 
demonstrate. Of course merely because there is no hierarchy of rights does not mean that 
the decisions are unproblematic or even necessarily that the results reached were correct.  
 
In considering possible explanations for these cases, it is firstly necessary to bear in mind the 
forms of discrimination in issue and particularly the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination. While cases such as Ladele and McFarlane undoubtedly state that it is not 
indirect discrimination to prohibit direct discrimination, this can be explained on the basis 
that preventing direct discrimination (here on the ground of sexual orientation) is given a 
greater priority than indirect discrimination (here on the ground of religion or belief). This 
conclusion is understandable given the insistence in English law that direct discrimination 
cannot be justified unless a specific exemption applies but indirect discrimination can be. 
These cases therefore demonstrate a hierarchy of different types of discrimination, but do 
not necessarily demonstrate a hierarchy between different protected characteristics.  
 
Secondly, the courts may have decided these cases against the religious actors not because 
the courts undervalue religion, but because of the courts’ feelings of institutional 
incompetence and deference towards the detailed statutory scheme in the Equality Act 
2010 and in preceding legislation, particularly given the highly controversial and sensitive 
context in which these cases arise. Again this does not mean these decisions are necessarily 
justifiable, but it goes some way to explaining them. Particularly with regard to Catholic 
Care, there had been considerable public and legislative debate as to whether religious 
adoption agencies should have an exemption. It was decided that there should only be a 
temporary exemption, lasting until the end of 2008.7 Similarly, there had been considerable 
Parliamentary debate about the rights of bed and breakfast owners, (Cobb, 2009) but a 
specific exemption was not included in the legislation.  
 
Furthermore, while the courts have denied a right to discriminate within the secular context, 
the Equality Act gives numerous rights to religious organisations to discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation and other grounds, although the courts have rejected claims seeking to 
extend these exemptions, as Catholic Care demonstrates. These exemptions are in addition 
to those available to all employers and organisations. In employment, in addition to the 
usual exemption where being of for example a particular sexual orientation is a genuine 
occupational requirement, there is an exemption allowing sex, sexual orientation, marital 
status and transgender discrimination where the employment is for the purposes of an 
organised religion, as described above. There is also an exemption allowing religious 
discrimination in employment where the organisation has a religious ethos, although it is 
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unclear whether this adds anything to the standard genuine occupational requirement 
exemption.8 In addition, organisations relating to religion or belief may also impose 
restrictions on the provision of services9 if this is applied in order to comply with the 
compliance or non-conflict principle as detailed above, as long as the service is not provided 
on behalf of a public authority or under the terms of a contract between the organisations 
and the public authority. 
 
A religious organisation can therefore implement its discriminatory beliefs in some contexts 
and is not required to accept the state’s conception of equality. If all that is needed for there 
to be a hierarchy of rights is that one right ‘wins’ against another in a particular context, 
given the existence of these exemptions, then it could as easily be argued that religion 
trumps sexual orientation discrimination (see Johnson and Vanderbeck 2014). In the same 
way though as cases such as Ladele do not necessarily show the trumping of sexual 
orientation above religion, these exemptions do not necessarily demonstrate the converse 
hierarchy of rights. It is necessary to see the Equality Act scheme as a whole: in some cases 
religious concerns will be predominant, in others sexual orientation. The exemptions are 
valid responses to the need to protect the autonomy and religious freedom rights of 
religious organisations, although of course there will be considerable disagreement on their 
appropriate scope. 
 
Within the context of religious discriminatory expression within the workplace, rather than 
claims to discriminate by employees it is also very difficult to see a hierarchy of rights 
(Pearson 2014). Rather these claims are highly context specific, although this may be 
because these decisions have primarily been made at Employment Tribunal level and 
therefore there is little general guidance available. Some cases have held that discriminatory 
expression can be prohibited. In Apelogun-Gabriels v Lambeth ((2006) ET/2301976/05) an 
employee was dismissed because he distributed a document to his colleagues which stated 
that, ‘sexual activity between members of the same sex is universally condemned’ and ‘male 
homosexuality is forbidden by law and punished by death’, following a prayer meeting at his 
place of work which took place with his employer’s consent. Similarly in Haye v Lewisham 
((2010) ET 2301852/2009) an employee was dismissed when she sent an email from her 
work account to the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement (LGCM). In it she stated that being 
gay is a sin, that LGCM was ‘deceiving’ people into believing that it was acceptable to be gay 
and a Christian and urged them ‘to repent and turn from your sinful ways before [it’s] too 
late… Hell is not a nice place’. In both cases it was held that the claimants had not been 
subjected to direct or indirect discrimination and had not been unfairly dismissed. It has also 
been held that dismissal for repeated attempts at proselytisation towards a more junior 
member of staff, which did not involve any discriminatory speech, did not amount to unfair 
dismissal.10  
However, in other cases it has been held that discriminatory religious expression is not a 
sufficient reason for disciplinary action. In Smith v Trafford Housing Trust ([2012] EWHC 
3221 (Ch). it was held that it amounted to wrongful dismissal where a housing manager was 
demoted to a non-managerial position with a 40% reduction in pay because of comments he 
made on Facebook about civil partnerships in religious premises. He posted a news article 
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entitled, ‘Gay church ‘marriages’ set to get the go-ahead’ and commented ‘an equality too 
far’. After a colleague replied ‘does this mean you don’t approve?’ he replied: 
No not really, I don’t understand why people who have no faith and don’t believe in 
Christ would want to get hitched in church the bible is quite specific that marriage is 
for men and women if the state wants to offer civil marriage to same sex then that is 
up to the state; but the state shouldn’t impose it’s [sic] rules on places of faith and 
conscience.11  
 
Similarly in the recent case of Mbuyi v Newpark Childcare, ((2015) ET 3300656/2014) a 
nursery assistant was alleged to have said to a colleague ‘Oh my God, are you a lesbian?’ 
(something which at the time no complaint was made about) and a number of months later, 
during the course of a conversation about the church the claimant attended, stated that 
homosexuality was a sin. The tribunal held that dismissal for these reasons amounted to 
direct or alternatively indirect religious discrimination because it relied on stereotypical 
assumptions about Evangelical Christianity and because she was asked hostile questions 
about her beliefs, rather than her actions, which did not relate to the specific allegations at 
issue, at a disciplinary meeting.  
 
These varying decisions show that it is not possible to say that there is a hierarchy of rights 
in this context. Whether the expression is permissible will depend on the offensiveness of 
the speech and the context in which it is made: whether it takes place within work time, 
whether it is in the context of a conversation about religious matters or whether it is the 
result of active, unwanted proselytisation.  
 
However, while in the majority of cases there are alternative explanations which do not 
depend on there being a hierarchy of rights within the Equality Act, one case does strongly 
suggest that religion was there undervalued in comparison to other rights. In the well 
publicised case of Eweida v British Airways ([2010] ICR 890) a member of BA’s check in staff 
wished to wear a cross visibly while at work, which contravened BA’s uniform policy. Her 
claim of indirect discrimination failed because it did not put Christians as a whole or an 
‘identifiable section of the workforce’12 at a disadvantage.13 It was held that the claimant 
had not shown herself to be a member of a group that had been disadvantaged by the 
company’s no jewellery policy in being forbidden to wear a cross visibly as she was the only 
one in a workforce of 30,000 that had complained about the policy. This was an extremely 
narrow and unsatisfactory analysis of indirect discrimination (see also Hatzis, 2011). It is not 
necessary for the group that a claimant asserts she is part of to exist at the place of work. To 
require this would hardly break down structural barriers at work, since it would mean 
indirect discrimination claims could not be brought where a policy was harsh enough to 
discourage members of a particular group from applying for employment. (Pitt 2011). Thus 
in Edwards v London Underground ([1998] EWCA Civ 877) a woman could claim indirect sex 
discrimination where she could not work a shift pattern because of her child care 
responsibilities. It did not matter that she was the only woman who had complained about 
the policy, bearing in mind that very few women worked for London Underground at the 
time (only 21 out of a workforce of 2044) and that in the population at large women were 
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more likely to be disadvantaged by such a policy because they were more likely to have child 
care responsibilities. It was therefore always possible for a pool of comparators to be 
hypothetical and it is surprising that this was not recognised in Eweida. 
 
While this was a highly restrictive interpretation of indirect discrimination, this was a 
relatively isolated case14 and later developments have ameliorated this problem. In Eweida v 
UK [2013] ECHR 37 the ECtHR held that Eweida’s treatment amounted to a contravention of 
Art 9. Partly as a result, the Court of Appeal gave a less restrictive interpretation of indirect 
discrimination in the later case of Mba v Merton LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1562. Mba refused to 
work on a Sunday because of her Christian beliefs. After some confusion in the lower courts 
about the relevance of this not being (as they saw it) a core belief of Christianity, the Court 
of Appeal disavowed this reasoning. It held that it was not necessary that all Christians or 
even a majority refused to work on a Sunday as it was clear that some Christians, including 
the claimant, refused to do so. It is however remarkable that these difficulties for the 
claimants arose in cases which hardly involve entirely idiosyncratic beliefs. That some, 
although by no means all or even a majority of Christians, wish to wear a cross as a way of 
manifesting their faith or refuse to work on Sundays is fairly well known. Nevertheless it is 
not possible to extrapolate from them a conclusion that religion is treated less favourably in 
general. 
 
Is a hierarchy of rights appropriate? 
 
While these cases do not therefore demonstrate a hierarchy of rights, a very different 
argument has been made, particularly by Aileen McColgan, (2009, 2014; also Lester and 
Uccellari 2008) that religion is fundamentally different from the other protected 
characteristics. As a result, it is argued, artificially treating it the same will affect the whole 
scheme of the Equality Act. However, even if it is justifiable to say that religion is different 
from the other protected characteristics, an assumption which will be addressed further 
below, these fears have proved to be unfounded.  
 
A principal part of this argument is that in order to avoid unwanted results, religious 
discrimination will be defined as indirect rather than direct so it can be justified, following 
the normal position that direct discrimination is illegal unless a specific exemption, which 
are narrowly interpreted, applies. It is argued that including religion would affect the 
traditional distinction between these concepts and lessen the protection given by 
discrimination law overall. However, this redefinition does not appear to have occurred.  
 
In R(E) v JFS ([2010] 2 AC 728) a challenge was made to a Jewish faith school’s admission 
policy on the basis that it unlawfully racially discriminated. JFS gave priority to children who 
were regarded as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. This applied a matrilineal test: a 
person was regarded as Jewish if his mother was Jewish or had converted to Judaism 
through Orthodox auspices. E was therefore not considered to be Jewish, although his father 
was Jewish and his mother had converted to Judaism (but not through Orthodox auspices) 
and the family followed Jewish religious practices. The majority of the Supreme Court held 
that the policy was direct race discrimination. It is clear that Jews are an ethnic group,15 and 
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so a test based on descent from a Jewish mother must be direct race discrimination. It is a 
foundational principle of English discrimination law that a subjective intention to 
discriminate is not necessary.16 Indeed, it is no defence that a person may have acted from 
the best of motives. It was therefore irrelevant that the test applied was for sincere religious 
reasons and could not be described as ‘racist’ in any usual sense. The majority therefore 
resisted calls to alter established jurisprudence and to ‘allow the result to dictate the 
reasoning’.17 To decide this case the other way (as did the court at first instance, and four of 
the nine members of the Supreme Court) would have weakened discrimination law. As Lord 
Phillips suggested, permitting discrimination in these circumstances would have to be a 
matter for Parliament and a legislative exemption. In addition to not disrupting the 
distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, it is also noticeable that neither this 
case nor any other has led to any clear demand to introduce a general justification defence 
to direct discrimination claims; an alternative concern raised about the inclusion of religion 
as a protected characteristic (Pitt, 2011). 
 
Whilst JFS gave the correct reading of the Equality Act, this analysis is not without its 
problems. Requiring JFS to change its policy may well be considered appropriate by many 
given that it concerned admissions criteria to a state funded school. However, this decision 
evidently applies outside this specific context. As described above there are exemptions for 
employment which is for the purposes of an organised religion but these do not apply to 
race discrimination. Applying a test of Jewishness which depended on matrilineal descent 
would therefore be impermissible race discrimination even for centrally religious roles. 
However, to not permit a religion to define religious membership for its own internal 
purposes would be to interfere with the very core of religious autonomy. Nevertheless, the 
court’s decision was still correct. Rather than changing the scheme of discrimination law by 
defining this as indirect rather than direct discrimination, the proper reaction to such a 
problem would be to have a specific exemption dealing with this situation, although the 
scope and wording of such an exemption would be inevitably difficult and controversial. 
Probably because this issue has not arisen in practice, there have not been any moves to do 
so.  
 
JFS therefore does not demonstrate a weakening of the distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination. McColgan (2009 and 2014) also has pointed to Azmi v Kirklees MBC 
([2007] ICR 1154) as an example. Azmi was a teaching assistant, who worked with children 
who did not speak English as their first language. She was Muslim and wished to be able to 
wear a full face veil while working unless this was with only female teachers, but the school 
forbade her from doing so. It was held this was indirect rather than direct discrimination and 
could be justified. The tribunal accepted that it was not possible for her to only work with 
female teachers as all the children were taught by some male teachers and that she was not 
as effective in communicating with and teaching the children if they could not see her face. 
It was not direct discrimination because she would have been treated in the same way had 
she wished to cover her face for a reason unrelated to her religious beliefs.  
 
McColgan argues that the conclusion that this is not direct discrimination is inconsistent 
with the treatment of pregnancy discrimination as direct sex discrimination. As the ECJ put it 
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in Dekker v Stiching, (C-177/88, [1990] ECR I-34941) ‘Only women can be refused 
employment on the ground of pregnancy and such a refusal therefore constitutes direct 
discrimination on the ground of sex.’18 McColgan’s argument is that in reality only Muslim 
women are likely to want to cover their face while working and so this is analogous to 
pregnancy discrimination being sex discrimination. The inclusion of pregnancy as direct sex 
discrimination was an important advance for women’s advancement in the workplace. It 
prevented employers from arguing that it was not sex discrimination if they would have 
dismissed an employee who would have been similarly absent for ill health or from allowing 
them to justify their treatment of pregnant women based on economic considerations.  
 
Nevertheless pregnancy and veiling for religious reasons are not comparable situations. 
While it may be difficult to think of an example of why someone may wish to cover their 
face apart from because of their Muslim beliefs, there is not the intrinsic link between being 
female and being pregnant, even though of course not all women are pregnant, or even can 
become pregnant. Treating this as direct discrimination would also create inconsistencies in 
another sense. If an employer had a rule that hair must be uncovered at work, this would 
place Muslim women who wished to wear a hijab at a disadvantage compared to others and 
thus be indirect discrimination. However, it is quite possible to think of other groups who 
may wish to wear head-coverings, for non-religious as well as religious reasons. This cannot 
therefore be direct discrimination. But to treat covering the face as direct discrimination but 
wearing a headscarf as indirect discrimination would be extremely odd, particularly bearing 
in mind that there is likely to be far more justification for allowing the first but not the 
second. Contrary then to McColgan’s argument, Azmi does not therefore show any 
narrowing of the direct discrimination concept but is an orthodox application of it. 
Practically also, treating pregnancy as part of sex discrimination is firmly established, and 
pregnancy is now also a protected characteristic in its own right in the Equality Act. Even if 
Azmi were inconsistent with the treatment of pregnancy discrimination, the treatment of 
pregnancy discrimination is highly unlikely to be altered. 
 
Another context where it could be argued that the inclusion of religion or belief may or will 
alter established concepts, is in the broadening of the concept of indirect discrimination and 
its lost relationship with group disadvantage at the expense of its coherence. As described 
above, the phrase ‘put or would put persons with whom [the claimant] shares the 
characteristic at a disadvantage’19 was initially interpreted restrictively in the religious 
context in Eweida v British Airways but this reasoning was disapproved of in Eweida v UK by 
the ECJ and later disavowed by the English courts in Mba. This means, given the subjective 
and variable nature of religious belief, and even more so of non-religious beliefs, that it is 
theoretically possible for the group who has been disadvantaged to be a group of one. While 
this does lessen the link between indirect discrimination and group disadvantage, it is not 
clear that this amounts to, if anything, more than a slight shift in emphasis. The group the 
claimant argued had been disadvantaged and that she was a member of could always be 
hypothetical within the workforce. Even applying an entirely orthodox analysis, it should not 
have mattered that Eweida was the only one out of the workforce to make a complaint 
about the policy. 
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Is religion different from other protected characteristics? 
 
While the risks put forward by McColgan and others resulting from the inclusion of religion 
have not therefore materialised, there is a more foundational problem with the argument. 
The critique rests to some extent on a view that religion is different from other protected 
characteristics. A couple of reasons have been put forward for this. Firstly, as Sedley LJ 
stated in Eweida v British Airways,  ‘one cannot help observing that all of these 
[characteristics] apart from religion or belief are objective characteristics of individuals; 
religion and belief alone are matters of choice’.20 This though this is an unsatisfactory 
answer. It fails to take an internal view of religion (McCrudden, 2011) as few believers would 
define their religion in this way. Moreover, to describe it in this way implies that religion is a 
relatively unimportant consumer choice. It fails to describe why religion may be so 
important to individuals (Vickers, 2010). While there may be some who do perceive their 
religion in this way, and the ‘marketplace of religion’ may be increasing, (Hunt, 2005) this 
understanding of the nature of religious belief cannot be taken to be representative 
(Bacquet, 2015; Edge, 2000). 
 
A further argument is that religion is different because it (tends to) place extensive 
requirements for behaviour onto believers. In particular, these obligations may require 
believers to discriminate against others and therefore create conflict between rights (Lester 
and Uccellari, 2008). Unlike other protected characteristics like race, religion or belief is not 
merely a status, in that a person is a Christian or a Muslim, but a reason for acting in a 
particular way. Nevertheless, the differences between religion and other protected 
characteristics can be overstated in this respect. In a direct discrimination claim religion is 
merely a status, in the same way as any other protected characteristic: a person is 
discriminated against not because of any particular action they have taken or its effect on 
the workplace, but merely because they are, for example a Christian. It is in indirect 
discrimination claims that it could be argued there is the most difference, since by being 
about requests to accommodate behaviour engaged in for religious reasons, religious claims 
may require the modification of workplace rules. This does not demonstrate though that 
religion is necessarily different from other protected characteristics. Indirect discrimination 
claims are inherently about challenging seemingly neutral rules. There is little structural 
difference between a sex discrimination claim arguing that a particular shift pattern is 
indirectly discriminatory because women are more likely to have childcare responsibilities 
and therefore less able to comply with it and a religious discrimination claim arguing that a 
requirement to work on Friday lunchtime is indirect discrimination against Muslims. While 
accommodating religion in this way may well impose burdens on employers and others, 
again this is not unique to religion. Much of the point of discrimination law is to challenge 
established practices that may lead to exclusion or disadvantage. The burden on employers 
is in any case likely to be higher with pregnancy and disability but it is accepted that it is 
right to prohibit discrimination on these grounds.  
 
The fact that religious beliefs may conflict with other protected characteristics, including the 
religious beliefs of others, sexual orientation and potentially race and disability (Elias and 
Coppel, 2001) is however a relevant difference. This issue will though mainly arise in the 
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context of indirect discrimination claims where religious employees are seeking to be 
accommodated in their religious beliefs. Concerns about the rights of others can therefore 
be taken into account at the justification stage in indirect discrimination claims, in addition 
to considering the employer’s interests in terms of practicality, the interests of other 
employees and so on. While claims may therefore be more complex, this does not make the 
claim wholly different from other indirect discrimination claims. 
 
Furthermore, excluding religion from the Equality Act would lead to gaps in coverage. As 
McColgan herself makes clear, there are clear links between religion and ethnicity. There has 
been a rise in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment, (Ogan et al, 2013) but for the 
purposes of discrimination law it has been held that Muslims per se do not constitute an 
ethnic group, given the highly varied backgrounds of adherents.21 To fail to protect Muslims 
from stereotypical and discriminatory attitudes within the sphere covered by discrimination 
law would evidently fail to address structural disadvantage within society.  
 
Pitt (2010) has argued that protection should be left to Article 9 ECHR, coupled with a 
broader understanding of cultural or ethnic discrimination, because claims are primarily 
about religious freedom rather than discrimination. It is not so easy though to distinguish 
between the two. Freedom tends to be restricted unequally. Indeed what the majority may 
not even perceive as a restriction of freedom because they have no wish to do the 
prohibited act, may be perceived very differently by a minority group. There are also 
practical problems. Confining protection to Art 9 would create problems for claimants 
particularly in the employment context since they would not be able to bring claims alleging 
a breach of Art 9 to an Employment Tribunal, which is at least in theory, a faster, cheaper 
and more informal method of ensuring redress than the court system. It is also unclear what 
the benefits would be of such a policy. To withdraw detailed legislation on some points, for 
example when religious organisations can discriminate in employment would cause 
confusion and be detrimental to the protection of both religion and other rights. In other 
contexts which are not so clearly delineated in the legislation, such as the extent to which a 
person’s religious beliefs should be accommodated at work, the courts would still have to 
make difficult decisions about the boundaries of the right, particularly where rights conflict. 
In fact the test itself would be very similar. Under both Art 9 and indirect discrimination 
claims, there is a proportionality test which involves the consideration of the rights of 
others. It is therefore unclear what the benefit would be. To exclude religion from the 
Equality Act would be a retrograde step for equality law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article began by highlighting two critiques of the treatment of religion: firstly that 
religion had been undervalued, and secondly that it was inappropriate to include religion 
because of its differences to other protected characteristics. Neither of these arguments 
have though been made out. In relation to the first, while there may have been a less 
sympathetic approach to religious claims made under equality legislation in a few cases, a 
far more nuanced interpretation is necessary. Religion or belief has not been systemically 
undervalued. As to the second, the dangers highlighted by this argument have not 
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materialised. There have not been major reinterpretations of established concepts in the 
Equality Act. While this article therefore sounds a positive note, this is not wholly 
unqualified. This is a controversial, fast-moving and complex area of law. The inclusion of 
religion in the Equality Act will continue to pose challenges and cases will continue to arise. 
There is on-going work to be done in articulating the appropriate boundary of the right. 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                     
1 Although they did give her the option of transferring jobs or of only requiring her to 
administer the simple signing of the register rather than performing full ceremonies.  
2 Equality Act 2010 s.13. The test at the time referred to ‘on the ground of’ rather than 
‘because of’ but this change in terminology was not meant to have any substantive effect.  
3 Equality Act 2010 s.19. 
4 Both cases arose before the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, although Hall and 
Preddy were in a civil partnership. 
5 Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2012] UKUT 
395 (TCC). Although see the different decision made by the Scottish Charity Appeals Panel in 
St Margaret’s Children and Family Care Society App 2/13 (31 Jan 2013). 
6 Equality Act Schedule 9 para 2. 
7 The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 otherwise came into force on 30th 
April 2007. 
8 The employer must still demonstrate that ‘having regard to [the religious] ethos and to the 
nature or context of the work’ being of a particular religion or belief is an occupational 
requirement and a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. Equality Act 2010 
Schedule 9 para 3.  
9 Specifically it may restrict: ‘membership of the organisation, participation in activities 
undertaken by the organisation or on its behalf or under its auspices; 
the provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of activities undertaken by 
the organisation or on its behalf or under its auspices; or the use or disposal of premises 
owned or controlled by the organisation.’ Equality Act 2010 Schedule 23 para 2. 
10 Wasteney v East London NHS Foundation Trust 3200658/2014. 
11 [2012] EWHC 3221 (Ch) at para 4. 
12 [2010] ICR 890, 896. 
13 Direct discrimination may also have been relevant because other religious symbols such as 
the Sikh turban were permitted.  
14 That is in so far as religious discrimination cases under the Equality Act go. There were 
greater problems with cases brought under Art 9 ECHR, as for example in R(Begum) v 
Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100 where it was held that there was no interference with 
the claimant’s rights when she was prohibited from wearing a jilbab to school as there were 
other schools she could attend. See Pearson (2013). 
15 Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd [1980] IRLR 427. 
16 See eg James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751.  
17 JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 at para 70 (Baroness Hale). 
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18
 Quoted in McColgan (2014): 157. 
19 Equality Act 2010 s.19.  
20 See also Schiek (2002). 
21 Nzayi v Rymans EAT [1988] 6/88.  
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